University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Senior Thesis Projects, 1993-2002

College Scholars

2000

Economic and Political Integration: Europe and the Americas
Phynessa McCurry

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_interstp2

Recommended Citation
McCurry, Phynessa, "Economic and Political Integration: Europe and the Americas" (2000). Senior Thesis
Projects, 1993-2002.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_interstp2/49

This Project is brought to you for free and open access by the College Scholars at TRACE: Tennessee Research and
Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior Thesis Projects, 1993-2002 by an authorized
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact
trace@utk.edu.

COLLEGE SCHOLARS PROJECT APPROVAL

Mentor

COMMITIEE MEMBERS' SIGNATURES

2A

~ 3J:mum

3 R_e_q_ui_re_
d)_ _ _ _ __

4~l~

bL

\2a~.c-~

PLEASE ATTACH A CO py OF THE SEN IOR PROJECT TO THIS SHEET AND
RETURN BOTH TO THE PROGRAM DIRECTOR. THIS PAGE SHOULD BE DATED
AND COMPLETED ON THE DATE THAT YOUR DEFENSE IS HELD.

DATE COMPLETED - - - - - - - -

-

McCurry 1

-

Economic and Political Integration:
Europe and the Americas
Purpose of Paper

-

-

-

-

-

As states have coalesced into regional organizations, the contemporary global political
economy has seen the emergence of three powerful blocs. First, centered on the wealthy states
of North America, the American bloc spans North, Central, and South America. Second, the
European bloc, centered on highly industrialized countries in Western Europe, the European bloc
includes Eastern European states and some Eurasian states. Finally, an Asian bloc has emerged
in the past half-century around rapidly industrialized Japan.
This paper will focus on the first two powers-the American bloc and the European bloc.
In the past century, both regions have dramatically changed composition. On the economic
level, Europe progressed from a fragmented mass of states to a cohesive group that acts as a
whole. Along the path to economic integration, European states also progressed toward political
integration.
The American bloc has not attained the level of integration that Europe has achieved; yet
it has taken important steps in that direction. Intra-regional markets have opened up, liberalizing
trade between the members. Politically, the region has founded the Organization of American
States, a multilateral organization through which individual states can voice their concerns.
At first glance, several differences between the two blocs are apparent.

Differences

between these two blocs are best illustrated through the history of their integration. This paper
will look at integration in the two blocs and attempt to discern exactly how integration differs

_

between them. It will address motives and methods for integration and attempt to predict the

-

next step in the integration process.

-

-
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Background: Implications for Conflict and Cooperation
After the Second World War, the United States emerged as the pre-eminent global power.
The United States had not suffered the casualties that plagued other participants in the conflict,
and, with the exception of Pearl Harbor, its territory was relatively unscathed by the war. In fact,
the war aided the United States by pulling it out of the vast depression that started in 1929. With
almost fifty percent of world GNP, the US economy dwarfed the post-war economies of other
states. In certain sectors, such as crude petroleum production, the US output exceeded the output
of all other states combined. (See Figure 1, "Economic Role of the United States in 1950.,,)1

Figure 1

-

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Economic Role of the United States in 1950
Produced 17% of the world's wheat
US exports accounted for 18% of world trade
Produced 42% of the world's iron ore
Produced 45% of the world's crude steel
Held 49% of international financial reserves
Produced 53% of the world's crude petroleum
Almost 50% of world GNP produced within the United States

Source: Rosati, p. 52 .

..

-

-

Continuing prosperity throughout the fifties caused many to speculate that the United
States would remain an uncontested superpower throughout the twentieth century.

The

following decade demonstrated that not to be the case. Formerly war-ravaged states rebuilt their
industrial and banking sectors with unbelievable rapidity. Germany and Japan, in particular,
rehabilitated at an unprecedented rate. Analysts were keenly aware that US improvements were
not keeping pace with the growth of foreign economies. Soviet technology and influence began

I Jerel

A. Rosati, The Politics of United States Foreign Policy, (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers,
1999), p. 52.

-
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to threaten the United States, which saw itself as lagging dangerously behind. According to

-

realists, who see state power as a zero-sum game,2 the relative increase in European and Soviet

-

-

-

-

-

-

power caused a relative decrease in US power. The result was the perception of parity between
the United States and Soviet Union, with Europe not far behind. 3
The situation resulting from the US-USSR conflict is a classic example of tight
bipolarity. According to balance of power theory, some states seek to gain regional or global
hegemony. Feeling their security threatened by the rise of a strong state, states that are smaller
or weaker band together to counter the expanding power of the strong state. Their goal is to keep
anyone state from obtaining a monopoly of international power. In the example of the postWorld War II era, the United States emerged as a hegemonic power. The Soviet Union soon
rose to challenge US hegemony. Instead of the unipolar, US-dominated system, the international
community became a bipolar system.
The United States mutually feared that the other state would come to dominate the
international system. The Soviet Union declared spheres of influence in Eastern Europe and
Asia. In response to possible Soviet pre-eminence, the United States banded together with other
Western democracies, Japan, and South Korea.

It declared its own spheres of influence in

Central and South America. The result, as mentioned earlier, was a rigidly bipolar system: the
US-led bloc opposed to the USSR-led bloc.

The apparent standoff between these two

superpowers led to a scramble for each to enforce its own ideology on other states.

-

-

-

-

The zero-sum game is a notion that comes from Game Theory in International Relations. The central tenet is that
there is a set amount of world power. The power of anyone state is determined relative to other states. States
divide this power as one would divide a cake-a larger slice for one state means a smaller slice for another state.
The opposing idea is the "variable-sum" game, which holds that there is not a set amount of available power.
According to this theory, it is possible for states to gain power at the same time. In other words, one state's gain in
power does not necessarily mean another state's loss of power.
3 Rosati, p. 53.
2

-

-

-

-

-
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Both blocs were comprised of many weaker states in tight political alliance with the
larger state. Two main goals convinced smaller states to ally with one superpower or the other.
First, in some cases, the smaller states sought to balance against one of the superpowers. It could
join with the state that espoused its ideals and slow the momentum of the one it opposed.
Second, a small state could gain protection from the superpower to which it allied.
On the other hand, larger states sought to add smaller states to their bloc as a means for
preserving their own security. By holding them in a tight political or economic alliance, they
could assure themselves that the states would not side with the enemy. This practice, unlike the
former case, did not always cater to the will of the smaller state. The Soviet Union, in the
process of liberating Eastern Europe from Nazism, incorporated a number of smaller states.
Similarly, the United States rejected socialist and communist movements in Latin America,
effectively incorporating Latin America into its capitalist system.
In sum, the post-World War II era was ripe for economic and political integration. In
fact, the Cold War created a system that encouraged capitalists and communists to disseminate
their beliefs. Fearful that their states would actually cease to exist if they did not do otherwise,
each camp sometimes turned to force in order to coerce states into political and economic
integration.

Theoretical Basis for Economic Systems: Why Integrate?
The reasons less-developed countries (LDCs) typically engage in regional integration are
clear. Ninety less developed countries have populations under fifteen million, and over sixty of
those have populations under five million. When the citizens of these countries earn an income
of only a few hundred dollars per capita each year, the market of the entire country is no bigger

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-
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than the market of certain cities in developed countries. The resulting economic problem is that
the state is limited in the number of industries that can attain economies of scale. 4 The term
"economies of scale" indicates that output grows faster than input. If inputs increase by 25
percent, for example, outputs increase more than 25 percent. In order to attain economies of
scale, cost per unit of production must decline as more units are produced. 5
Given these conditions, it may be impossible for an industry in a small state to grow large
enough for the unit cost of production to decrease. (For that matter, it may be impossible for the
industry to grow large enough to make net profits.) Therefore, small states view economic
integration as a way to attain economies of scale. They can increase the size of the market for
their goods, specialize in the good that they produce most efficiently, and increase the amount of
affordable goods available to them from their trading partners. According to economic theory,
removing imposed barriers to trade allows all parties to grow economically.
Economic theory indicates that removing excess costs is the method by which all states
can grow economically. The First Theorem of Welfare Economics asserts that removing all
barriers to trade will result in the elimination of excesses from the system. For example, when
free trade makes it possible for other suppliers to offer their goods on a certain market, price
competition ensues.

Firms can no longer make excess earnings, termed profits.

Since

consumers have an option, the theory states, consumers will shop for the lowest prices. In the
presence of competitors, therefore, firms must cut prices as low as possible in order to attract
consumers to their product. In the end, each firm will charge only enough to cover its costs. The
firm that can produce a good at the lowest opportunity cost, therefore, will be the one to survive.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Central American Regional Integration (New York: The Carnegie Endowment of International
Peace, 1967), p. 6-8.
5 Mordechai E. Kreinin, International Economics: A Policy Approach (Fort Worth, TX: Dryden Press, 1998), p. 64.

4
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-
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That means the most efficient firm will be the only one to stay in business, which is assumed to
be advantageous in economic theory.6
According to the above reasoning, economic integration establishes an incentive for
efficiency. In the same manner that companies seek to control their costs, economic integration
demands that companies manage their resources efficiently. When firms that were once outside
the trading area begin vying for the same resources, resources flow to the sector that produces

-

requires will stay in business. 7

-

efficiently. If a certain state had no trading partners, which would be virtually impossible in the

-

-

-

the most output with them. In other words, the firm most capable of limiting the resources it

Economic integration also makes it easier for a state to offer a product that it produces

real world, it would have to be totally self-sufficient and produce every good itself. That state
will naturally produce some goods at lower cost than others. For instance, if the state lacks
capital, it will have difficulty producing capital-intensive goods.

On the other hand, if the

country has a large population but small land area, it may struggle to produce enough food for its
citizens.
By making trade as free as possible across borders, the state casts off the responsibilities
of a self-sufficient society. Not only can it attain products that it had no way of producing
before, it can specialize in the goods it produces most efficiently. The Ricardian Comparative
Advantage Theory of International Trade states exactly that principle. A state will choose to
produce the one good for which it has a comparative advantage over other states. Even if
Country A produces watches and cheese more cheaply than Country B can, it will choose to
produce the good it produces most cheaply_ If Country A, with its skilled labor force and better
Eithne Murpy, "Market, State, and Community," Core Issues in European Economic Integration, Eamon O'Shea
and Michael Keane, eds., (Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 1999), pp. 22-3.

6

-

-

-

-
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assembly plants, can produce watches more cheaply than it can produce cheese, it will specialize
in watch production and export watches to Country B. Country B, on the other hand, will
produce only cheese and export it to Country A. Since each state produces only the good in
which it has the comparative advantage, they both maximize their output. Both countries will
produce more than they could under their former, non-integrated terms.
Large, developed states seek to integrate their economies for many of the same reasons;
however, large corporations often provide the impetus for integration.

Businesses view

economic integration as beneficial for three major reasons: 1) convenience, 2) efficiency, and 3)
growth. Economic integration is convenient because it allows companies to move products
across borders without the hassle of inspections or taxes. Manufacturers have greater access to
resources such as raw materials and labor. Just as they are encouraged to be efficient in their
plant operations, integration encourages their suppliers to operate efficiently, meaning that they
may be able to obtain inputs at a lower cost than before integration. Finally, just as in small
states, corporations in large states enjoy the profits of selling to a larger market. Even if they
have already reached economies of scale, companies can nevertheless earn a larger profit by

-

increasing their consumer base. A number of economic systems represent the range of

-

integration that member states can implement. This range, explained in Figure 2, is composed of

-

the

•

•
•
•
•

-

-

-

7

Murphy, p. 23.

free trade area
customs union
common market
economic union
monetary union.

-

-

-

-
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Figure 2

Economic Integration

A free trade area is a union in which member states do not levy tariffs between
themselves, but each nation reserves the right to set its own tariff on goods entering from
outside the free trade area. Generally, there are low economic demands on the parties
involved, that is, member states do not undergo great economic changes in the process of
opening their borders to free trade. In addition, free trade areas require a low level of
political cooperation between the states. They retain their individual sovereignty to levy
tariffs against outside goods, so negotiation for a common outside tariff is not necessary. 8
In customs unions, not only do members eliminate tariffs between themselves,

they levy a common tariff against goods entering from outside the union. This type of
economic union requires that states negotiate a common external tariff, which requires
more economic and political cooperation between the states. All barriers to trade are still
not lifted, however. States retain the right to impose nontariff barriers (NTBs) such as
health or safety standards on goods coming from outside or from other member states.
The common market requires more cooperation than does the customs union.
For a common market, the member states must agree on common policies in areas that
are not directly related to tariffs and trade.

For example, they must declare similar

policies on matters of "agriculture, transport, competition law, tax laws and regional
policies.,,9 Naturally, harmonizing these policies requires economic and political
cooperation.
An economic union entails all the provisions of the customs union, as well as the
free movement of labor, capital, goods, and services.

Members must harmonize

-

budgetary policies, monetary policies, and exchange rates.

-

currencies, removing all restrictions on capital flows, and integrating financial and

-

-

A monetary union entails guaranteeing the exchange rates of the menlber
banking markets. A central bank manages a single monetary policy for all the members,
and the individual currencies of the countries may be replaced by a single currency. 10

David N. Balaam and Michael Veseth, Introduction to International Political Economy (Upper Saddle River, NJ,
1996), P 219.
9 Immanuel Apel, European Monetary Integration: 1958-2002 (London: Routledge, 1998), p13.
8

-

-

-

-

-
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They are listed in order of least to greatest economic unity, so each successive union demands
increased economic cooperation. Because the members must negotiate additional trade policies
and policies related to trade (transport, agricultural, etc.), each level demands increased political
cooperation.
Evidence compiled from trade statistics generally proves the results of theoretical
modeling. That is to say, corporations and consumers seem to gain from economic integration.
They are able to find lower prices for goods, and industries are forced to run their businesses
more efficiently. Corporations, especially large, profitable corporations enjoy the possibilities of
expanding their markets and earning even more profits.
Why then, does every country not band together into a tight economic alliance? It is
possible to treat the range as a set of steps toward tighter integration, so, why is it that a state
does not realize that each step produces more and more benefits, and therefore continue to
integrate more and more fully? If the presented reasoning suggests that the most benefit would
accrue from engaging every state in a monetary union, what keeps national governments from
pursuing whole-heartedly this ideal? In fact, there are two explanations for states' behavior: 1)
they depend on economics as a tool to maintain domestic well being, and 2) forging a high-level
economic alliance demands that they relinquish a portion of political sovereignty.
Monetary policy is one of the important tools a central government uses to control its
well-being. For example, if unemployment rises in a state, the central government can pursue
certain monetary policies to correct the problem.

The government can raise the amount of

money in circulation by printing more currency or by buying back government bonds. Either
policy would increase consumer spending, increase suppliers' profits, and encourage businesses

10

Ibid.

-

-

-
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to employ. Conversely, the central government could implement contractionary monetary policy
in order to correct the problem of inflation in the state.
Another example of monetary policy, more applicable to the integration question, is the
ability of central governn1ents to devalue their currency. If, for some reason, world demand for
Italian goods falls, Italian workers would suffer unemployment. One logical step that the Italian
state could follow would be to devalue the lira. By doing so, Italian goods would appear cheaper
and therefore more appealing to international consumers. They would buy more Italian goods,
which would mean employment for Italian workers. The lira could return to its nonnal exchange
rate after the demand shortage and unemployment problem subsided.
The problem with monetary integration is that central governments lose the ability to
perform either of these actions when they integrate with other states. II In a monetary union, a
central bank determines how much currency the member states may print and controls exchange
rates. Therefore, a state would suffer even harsher effects if the central bank demanded a policy
that exacerbated the problem.

By enforcing contractionary policy during a period of high

unemployment, for instance, the central bank could cause inflation to increase. Problems such as
these arise in situations where a single bank tries to coordinate policy for a number of states.
Naturally, there will be times that some states experience inflation while others experience
unemployment, so the central bank's policy will have a negative effect on one or the other.

Theoretical Basis for Political Integration: Why not integrate?

Losing certain economic powers can be damaging to a state, as demonstrated above.
However, economic control has higher implications as welL Agreeing to a strong economic

II Alison M.S. Watson, Aspects of European Monetary Integration: The Politics of Convergence (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1997) p. 6.

-

-
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alliance requires a high degree of political cooperation. In fact, an economic alliance may
determine certain political choices that normally fall into the realm of politics. Therefore, a
state's leaders may feel that a strong economic alliance infringes on that state's sovereignty.

It is undeniable that making treaties is an exercise of state sovereignty. 12 However, when
states bind themselves to a certain agreement, they relinquish a portion of sovereignty as well.
They are forced to bring domestic political issues into accord. One example of this fact is the
case of Ireland's anti-abortion policy. As delegates to the Maastricht summit in the Netherlands
finalized plans for the European Union, Irish courts were hearing the case of a fourteen-year-old
rape victim who wanted an abortion. Unlike Ireland, most European states do not impose a ban
on abortion. Irish pro-life lobbyists felt the threat of lost sovereignty in face of states that do not
agree with its policy. 13
Creating a monetary alliance seems to produce many benefits, but there are also serious
disadvantages to the alliance. Furthermore, withdrawal from a monetary union is extremely
difficult, especially when the economic union adopts a common currency. A state may find itself
bound in a union that central planners mismanage. If the currency suffers devaluation or if the
union suffers unemployment, a member state has no choice but to carry on with policies that may
worsen its situation.
A situation in which a state is bound to a disagreeable policy indicates that the state has
given up some of its sovereignty. Sovereignty, at its most basic level, is the state's authority to
act in its own self-interest. For some political theorists, preservation of state sovereignty is the

-

This idea comes from the 1912 Wimbledon case in International Law.
Joe Joyce, "Abortion Case Raises Fears for Maastricht Ratification," The Guardian (London), 25 February 1992,
p. 8. Online. LEXIS@-NEXIS@ Academic Universe. 2 May 2000.
12

13

-

-

-

-

-

-

-
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Figure 3

What is Cooperation?
Two Views on Cooperation Between States

In International Relations theory there are many schools of thought that shape the way
policymakers view relationships between states. Two of the oldest are Realism and Idealism,
which present somewhat opposing views on the prospects of cooperation between states.
At the heart of the argument for each is a fundamental difference in the way they view
human nature. Realists believe that humans are "greedy, self-interested, fearful, [and] prestigehungry." 14 They are unable to change these basic characteristics, and the only power that can
control these destructive values is a central governing force or prudence.
Idealists, on the other hand, see human nature as an area in which progress towards
goodness is possible. They hold that humans are "capable of either good or evil, greed or
cooperation.,,15 Education, institutions, and laws can harness the negative characteristics and
make cooperation more likely.
Each system has its own beliefs about the status of the international system as well.
Because realists are inclined to believe that people are self-interested and power-hungry, they
posit that states, like humans, will always struggle to assert their dominance over one another.
The international system has no hierarchical power over the states, meaning that there is nothing
to force states to cooperate.

In this anarchic system, states will pursue their own interests

without regard for each other, making the international system a dangerous, chaotic place.
Idealists reject the notion that people cannot band together to create trans-national
institutions. These organizations, they believe, are the key to restraining the negative aspects of
human behavior. By creating laws and institutions for states to follow, cooperation is possible.
The fundamental values of idealists and realists have permeated International Relations
theory. The result is several theories built on their basic tenets. Examples of these are NeoLiberal Institutionalism, a variation of Idealism, and Moderate Realism.

14 Frances V. Harbour, Thinking About International Ethics: Moral Theory and Cases from American Foreign
Policy, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999) p. 15.
15 Ibid.

-
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central goal of any state.

According to these political theorists, policymakers have the

responsibility of preserving state security, so they should not risk binding the state in a pact that
could prove injurious.
The school of thought that most often posits this reasoning is the realist school. (See
Figure 3, "What is Cooperation? Two Views on Cooperation Between States.") In the extren1e
form, they doubt the value of making alliances toward the end of increasing security. Realists
are likely to point to the disagreeable, and even dangerous, effects of forging a tight union with
another state.

European Economic Integration

The above section delineates cost-benefit analysis that a state considers before choosing
to integrate with other states. The mentioned benefits, however, did not weigh as heavily in
Europe's choice to integrate as one might think. They did not seek to integrate in order to profit
from the typical benefits a state seeks from integration. Instead, the Soviet threat during the Cold
War provided the impetus for the economic union between Western European states. Since the
end of World War II, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had worked to establish
Communist governments throughout the world. The effects of communism were particularly
strong in Eastern Europe. Afraid that the Soviet Union would "Balkanize" Western Europe, the
United States set up a plan to prevent Western Europe from falling to con1n1unism.
The US response to the imposition of communism in Europe was the 1948 European
Recovery Program (ERP). Proposed by US Secretary of State George Marshall, the plan took on
the common name "Marshall Plan." It reflected the attitude of European and American leaders:
strong economic and political ties between European states would reduce Communist influence.

-

-

-

-
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The plan called for distribution of economic aid to all European states (even the Soviet
Union) that would collaborate on a program for recovery.

Russia and its satellites quickly

declined the invitation, indicating that the United States sought to recreate Europe as a model of
itself. Sixteen Western European nations eagerly joined the Marshall Plan.
At first, Truman had difficulty raising support for the Secretary of State's plan, but the
opposition would not hold out long. First, Marshall Plan opponents were embarrassed to have
the American Communist Party among their ranks. Then, the sudden fall of Czechoslovakia to

-

Communists convinced the majority to support the plan after all. In April 1948, Trunlan signed

-

over twelve billion dollars in aid to Europe. 16

-

In addition to supplying relief aid for the victims of the war, ERP provisions furnished a safe

-

-

-

-

of four billion dollars. During the course of the next three years, the Marshall Plan would send

method for reintegrating Western Germany into Europe.

Many realized the importance of

rearming Germany in order to stave off a potential Soviet invasion; however, German force had
proven dangerous to Europe before. The Americans felt that a close political tie with the rest of
Europe would deter Germany from threatening any of its neighbors. The safety stipulation was
important, and rejuvenating the German economy was essential to European recovery. Despite
Allied damage to the state, most of Europe's intact industrial facilities still lay in Germany.

17

The United States' insistence on these policies resulted partly from goodwill and partly
from following its own interests. US policymakers had recently witnessed the disaster of the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act's brand of protectionism. They did not wish to see their European
neighbors to suffer the same fate.

US policymakers viewed multi-Iateralism and trade

liberalization as the most important principles for economies to follow.

16

Also, European

Richard N. Current et aI., American History: A Survey (New York: Alfred A Knopf, Inc., 1987) p. 807.
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integration would provide markets and investment opportunities for US companies. In the postwar period, the United States suffered a trade surplus and therefore sought a market with demand
for its goods. For these reasons, the United States pressed Europe hard to establish economic
integration, even making trade liberalization imperative through the ERP. 18
US policymakers had become familiar with the innovative mass-production techniques of
Henry Ford. For that reason, creating a customs union stood out to US policymakers as a
method for rehabilitating European economy.

By drawing on a larger market for goods,

European firms could reap the financial benefits of economies of scale and mass-production.
With increased freedom to move goods across borders, states could properly allocate resources to
the most efficient sectors. Efficiency could in tum spur on technical advancement. 19 Technical
advancement would then assure economic growth in Europe.
One stipulation of the Marshall Plan was that Europe had to devise a mechanism for
allocating the aid it received. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC),
created in 1948, occupied itself with this challenge. One of that organization's early decisions

-

-

-

involved coal and steel allocation. Necessary for the industrial recovery of both France and
Germany, the iron ore, coke, and steel deposits of the Ruhr Valley lay entirely in neither
country's territory. France exported the majority of its iron ore deposits, yet suffered from the
lack of coal and steel. Conversely, Germany lacked iron ore but had abundant coal and steel
resources. This situation exemplified the need for resource allocation that the ERP advocated,
and resulted in one of Europe's first important economic alliances. 2o

17 Bill Lucarelli, The Origins and Evolution of the Single Market in Europe (Aldershot, England: Ashgate
Publishing, 1999), pp. 13-4, 21.
18 Lucarelli, p. 21.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 36.

-
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In 1951, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG-West Germany) formed
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

Belgium, the Netherlands, and

Luxembourg had recently taken Europe's first step toward economic integration and created a
customs union in 1948. 21 France and Germany invited the new alliance, called Benelux, and
Italy to join ECSC. 22 (See "Chronology of European Economic Organizations.")
The European Coal and Steel Community served as a common market between the six
members. It saw an increase in output during the 1950s, the causes of which, admittedly, could
not be entirely attributed to the common market. During that period, the general increase in
world economic activity bolstered output as much as common market practices. The union
suffered some problems as well. For instance, separating the coal and steel sectors from the rest
of the economy was nearly impossible. Second, the union did not achieve political integration as
its framers had hoped. Finally, the coal shortage of 1959 greatly weakened the Community and
contributed greatly to its collapse. 23
In reaction to the difficulty of separating out certain economic sectors for governance, the
six ECSC states created the European Economic Community. The EEC began with the 1957
Treaties of Rome, which simultaneously established the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom). The guiding principle for the European Economic Community was inten1al trade
liberalization. Beginning in 1958, member states eliminated customs duties and quotas between
themselves. Euratom united Europe in matters of technical and nuclear power cooperation. It
sought to encourage research, distribute technical information, institute safety standards, develop

-

21

22

23

-

-

The European Union Encyclopedia and Dictionary: 1999 3d ed., (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1999): p.

Xlll.

Lucarelli, p. 36.
The European Union Encyclopedia and Dictionary: 1999, 3d ed.,

S.v.

"ECSC."

-
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Chronology of European Economic Organizations
Jan 1948: Customs union between Belgium,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

Jan 22, 1972: United Kingdom, Ireland, and
Denmark join the union.

April 18, 1951: Treaty of Paris establishes
European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC). Member states: Belgium, France,
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG-West
Germany), Italy, the Netherlands, and
Luxerrtbourg.

April 1972: EC sets up Snake monetary
system.

March 25, 1957: Treaties of Rome establish
the European Economic Community (EEC)
and European Atomic Energy Community
(EAEC or Euratom). Signed by France,
FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands.
Feb 1959: Benelux Economic Union:
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
May 3, 1960: Stockholm Convention,
comprising Austria, Denmark, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom, create the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA).
1964:
Common
established.

agricultural

market

April 8, 1965: The Merger Treaty integrated
the executives of the ECSE, EEC, and
Euratom, establishing a single Council of
Ministers and a single Commission.

July 22, 1972: Austria, Portugal, Iceland,
Sweden, and Switzerland sign Special
Relations Agreements with EEC.
May 14, 1973: Norway signs a free trade
agreement with the EEC.
Nov 20, 1979: Council of Ministers
endorsed the Tokyo Round of negotiations
for the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, which further reduced customs
duties.
Jan 1, 1981: Greece became the tenth
member of the EEC.
Jan 1, 1986: Spain and Portugal became full
members of the EC.
Feb 17, 1986: Single European Act (SEA)
signed by Belgium, France, FRG, Ireland,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, and the United Kingdom.
Feb 28, 1986: SEA signed by Denmark,
Greece, and Italy.
1986: Adopted European Flag.

June 1, 1968: Customs union completed.
All customs duties removed between
Belgium, France, FRG, Italy, Luxembourg,
and the Netherlands.
Oct 1970: Werner Report presented member
governments with plan for full Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU).
1971: World monetary crisis disrupts EMU.

July 1, 1987: SEA came into affect.
June 1989: Delors Plan presented to Heads
of Government. Stage One of EMU set for
1 July 1990.
3 Oct 1990: German reunification.

-

-

-
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5 Oct 1990: United Kingdom allowed
sterling to become a full member of the
ERM.
Dec 1990: Uruguay Round of GATT broke
down due to disagreements over EC
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
Dec 1991: Maastricht Summit, European
Council meeting in Maastricht, the
Netherlands; reached an agreement on the
Treaty on European Union (TEU), which
included substantial revision of the Rome
Treaties.

-

1 Nov 1993: TEU entered into force. EC
Member States became known as the
European Union (EU).

-

1 Jan 1994: Stage Two of EMU began.

1 Jan 1993: Internal market completed.

-

-

-

Source: The European Union Encyclopedia
and Directory 1999.

1 Jan 1995: Austria, Finland, and Sweden
became menlbers of the EU.
25 March 1998: Conference in London on
Commission
enlargement of the EU.
recommended that 11 Member States
participate in the EMU from the beginning:
Austria,
Belgium,
Finland,
France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Denmark,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom declined
participation, and Greece failed to meet the
convergence criteria.
31 Dec 1998: Conversion rates between
euro and 11 Member currencies irrevocably
fixed.
1 Jan 1999: Third stage of EMU began.
Euro came into existence, replacing the
European Currency Unit (ECU).

-

-

-

-

-
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-
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nuclear energy installations, monitor provisions of nuclear ores and fuels, supervise the use of
radioactive materials, and advocate peaceful uses for nuclear energy.24
In 1967, three related alliances-the European Coal and Steel Community (what
remained of it), the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic
Community-formally joined in order to form the European Community (EC). Under this
umbrella, the EEC attained its goal of creating a customs union with the establishment of a
common external tariff in 1968.
The European Community defined the framework of what would later become the
European Union. The Treaty of Rome laid out provisions for integrating the economies of the
participants. It was highly successful in eliminating formal barriers to trade. Member states
phased out all tariffs and quotas by July 1968, eighteen months ahead of schedule. The result
was that labor, capital, goods, and services could flow more freely between the states. Because
of the common external tariff set that same year, goods from non-nlernber states faced the same
tariff no matter through which state they entered. 25
Unfortunately, the Treaty of Rome had some flaws that hindered the integration process.
Namely, the Treaty did not specify steps for removing non-tariff barriers to trade. Not yet
realizing this problem, the EC Heads of State or Government convened in The Hague in 1969.
Their plan was to "deepen and widen the Community." 26 They sought to deepen the integration
by eliminating non-tariff barriers and establishing a European Monetary Union by 1980. The
Community would widen to include four more members: Denmark, the United Kingdom,
Norway, and Ireland. (See Figure 4, "Expansion to the European Union.")

The European Union Encyclopedia and Dictionary: 1999, 3d ed., s.y. "EURATOM."
Andrew Scott, "Economic Integration in the European Union," The European Union Encyclopedia and
Dictionary: 1999, p. 138
26 Ibid., p. 138-9.
24

25

-
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...

Progress in the 1970s frustrated the framers. Although three of the invited members

..

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

joined the organization (Norway refused), the task of eliminating non-tariff barriers proved more
difficult than expected. The economic climate in the 1970s contributed to the difficulty. Early in
the decade, the Bretton Woods exchange system fell through, making Western European and
United States currencies unstable. 27

Figure 4

Expansion to the European Union

Year, StatelRegion
Agreement Signed by StatelRegion
1958
Membership
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
1961
Association Agreement
Greece
1963
Turkey
Association Agreement
Association Agreement (Yaounde)
A CP Countries
1970
Free Trade Agreement
Spain, Malta
1973
Membership
Denmark, Ireland, UK
Free Trade Agreement
Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland
Association Agreement
Cyprus
1975
Free Trade Agreement
Israel
Free Trade Agreement (Lome)
A CP Countries
1976
Cooperation Agreement
Maghreb
1977
Cooperation Agreement
Mashreq
1980
Cooperation Agreement
Yugoslavia
1981
Membership
Greece
1986
Membership
Portugal, Spain
1992
European Agreement
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland
1993
EEA Agreement
Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
European Agreement
Bulgaria, Romania
1995
Austria, Finland, Sweden
Membership
Source: Andre Sapir, "Regional Integration in Europe," The Economic Journal 102 (November 1992): 1492.

27

Ibid., p. 139.
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Delegates in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire had restructured the international currency
system that had dominated before Wodd War II. Before, major currencies had determined their
worth in terms of gold. In 1944, representatives at Bretton Woods decided that international
currency exchange would no longer depend on gold as the core unit of exchange. Instead of
determining each currency value in terms of gold and then establishing an exchange rate between
them, currency rates would be stated in terms of dollars. Pegged to the dollar, each currency
maintained a fixed exchange rate within a band one percent above or below its fixed exchange
rate with the dollar.28
Because all European Bank transactions took place in dollars, each central bank retained

...

extensive dollar reserves. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, US external deficits resulted in even

-

United States to back up its currency.

larger dollar reserves abroad. Naturally, European central banks began to doubt the ability of the

-

United States needed to devalue the dollar in order to alleviate unemployment problems.

-

However, because it was locked into a set exchange rate with European states there was no way

-

to devalue the dollar effectively. By 1971, the United States central bank could no longer

-

-

-

The United States had its complaints regarding the Bretton Woods System as well. The

promise gold for its foreign reserves. The Smithsonian Agreement stated this official policy
change: that the United States would no longer redeem dollars with gold. Although official
policies changed the system into a more relaxed exchange system, the Bretton Woods System
effectively broke apart with President Nixon's announcement of the Smithsonian Agreement.

28

Kreinin, p. 300.
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Exchange rates had fluctuated by one percent above or below the dollar in the Bretton

-

-

-

-

..
-

-

Woods System. In order to devalue the dollar, Smithsonian delegates needed to implement a
wider band of fluctuation. This system was not practical for European currencies, however.
Under the new system, European currencies would be able to float 2.25 percent above or the
dollar. This band implied an intra-European currency fluctuation of 4.5 percent. 29 Even more
troubling than a 4.5 percent difference in exchange rates, "under a 'crawling peg' regime, the
spread between two EEC currencies could reach as high as 9 [percent] in the long term if one
currency appreciated by the permitted 4.5 [percent] while another currency depreciated by the
same magnitude. ,,30 In light of these possible problems, European states sought to tighten an
economic union between themselves. Central banks, following a proposal by Prime Minister
Pierre Werner of Luxembourg, narrowed the band in which their currencies could float against
each other. They determined to maintain intra-European exchange rates within a band of 2.25
percent and allow currencies to float against the dollar at a maximum difference of 4.5 percent.
When graphed, this exchange rate system consisted of European currencies floating
inside a narrow band, which was inside a wider band. For that reason, the economic system set
up by Europe after the Bretton Woods Systen1 was called "the snake in the tunnel," or just "the
snake." That is, the "snake" was the European countries allowed to fluctuate by 2.25 percent,
and the "tunnel" was the 4.5 percent band outside the narrower band. Given the fact that the
snake system accounted for both European currency fluctuation and an exchange rate with the

-

-

When the US government failed to back the dollar by gold, the dollar devalued and European currencies revalued
(appreciated). The German mark revalued by 13.5 percent; the Dutch guilder and Belgium franc revalued by 11.6
percent; the French franc revalued by 8.6 percent, and the Italian lira by 7.5 percent in relation to the dollar.
(Lucarelli, p. 84.)
30 Lucarelli, pp. 84-5.
29

-
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dollar, it was created to work alongside the Bretton Woods System. It would replace Bretton

-

-

-

Woods, however, at its official collapse in 1973. 31
The snake in the tunnel was Europe's first attempt at economic and monetary union. In
fact, the Werner Report was the first time that the term "economic and monetary union," or
EMU, was used. The system faced difficulties, especially the oil crisis of 1973-74. During this
time, several currencies withdrew from the arrangement, notably, Britain and Ireland in 1972,

-

entirely in 1979. 32

_

Europe. Dollar problems in 1978, however, again encouraged the Europeans to consolidate their

-

alliance.

essentially a managed-float system. Its goal was to secure an area of monetary stability in

-

Western Europe. The foundation of the European Monetary System was the Exchange Rate

-

Mechanism (ERM), which connected European currencies and specified a maximum amount of

-

Italy in 1973, France in 1974 and then in 1976, and Norway in 1978. The plan fell through

Many states were hesitant to en1bark on another economically unifying venture in

They established the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, which was

fluctuation between the members. Each state had a central rate calculated on the basis of the
central rate of the European Currency Unit (ECU), a fictional European Currency supposed to
exemplify European currencies as a whole. 33
The snake was a managed-float system: currencies would float against each other in a
narrow band according to the market. Should a currency fall outside these limits, though, the
central banks would intervene to push the currency back within bounds.

If a currency had

constant difficulty keeping its currency at the specified exchange rate, the central banks would
recalculate the currency's value against the ECU.

31
32

Andre Szasz, The Road to European Monetary Union, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 36-37.
Apel, p. 42.

-

McCurry 24

The European Monetary System did not start out as a replacement for the Economic and

-

-

-

-

-

-

Monetary Union. It lacked the authority to enforce economic policy restraints on members, for
example. Due to EMS success throughout the 1980s, members of the European Community
regained the notion of turning the system into a full economic and monetary union. 34

European Political Integration

The major implication of establishing an economic and monetary union is that member
countries finally attained the level of political integration that framers of the European
Community (or even earlier, the European Coal and Steel Community) envisioned. As discussed
in the first few sections of this paper, economic sovereignty plays a large role in political
sovereignty. By allowing the European Central Bank to determine monetary policies such as
exchange rates and fiscal policies such as interest rates, the member states cede a great deal of
political authority to the Union.
Part of the difficulty in converting to an economic and monetary union was that not all
the members were members of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Britain, for example, was not a
member until 1990, and Greece was not until 1998. 35 Their absence made the calculation of a
European Currency Unit an untrue representation of European currencies. The Delors Plan,
which set a three-stage process toward creating an economic and monetary union, sought to
correct problems such as this.
President of the European Commission from 1895-1995, Jacques Delors envisioned four
goals for the European Community:

•

increasing EC revenue

The European Union Encyclopedia and Dictionary: 1999, 3d ed., s.y. "EMU."
Ibid.
35 Ibid.
33

34

-
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•
•

-

implementing firmer budgetary discipline
reforming and nlaintaining stricter control over the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP)
increasing funds for the Cohesion Fund (to reduce the socio-economic gap
between richest and poorest states), the European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), and the European Agricultural
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), called the "structural funds.,,36

•

The Delors Report sought and economic unification more than previous reports. The three-stage
process began on July 1, 1990 with the abolition of any controls on capital movement across
state borders. In the second stage, beginning January 1, 1994, the European Monetary Institute

-

final stage of unification consisted of conforming to a number of convergence criteria. At the

-

termination of this step, the members would implement the single currency. 37

-

(EMI) was established in order to coordinate central banks. Originally set to end in 1996, the

Convergence criteria serve to mollify any shock the members might suffer in converting
to a single currency by bringing potential members into closer economic accord. Specifically, a
state must meet four standards in order to join the union:

-

•

•

-

•

-

..

-

It must control inflation such that it is not more than 1.5% higher than the member
with the lowest inflation rate.
It must reduce budget deficits to 3% or less of GDP and the public debt must not
exceed 60% of GDP. Its exchange rate must remain within the 2.25% band for
two years before becoming a member.
Its interest rate must not differ by more than 2 % from that of the state with the
lowest interest rate. 38

So far, eleven states have met the criteria and are currently converting to the single currency:
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. (See Figure 5, "Maastricht Criteria and European Union map.)39

-

-

Lucarelli, p. 146.
Lucarelli, p. 146.
38 Ibid., pp. 146-7.
36

37
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Figure 5
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Maastricht Criteria

Economic Indicators and the Maastricht Treaty Convergence Criteria
1995 -1997
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Besides the political aspect of economic integration, the Delors Report called for

-

-

-

-

-

-

strengthening of political ties by giving more power to the European Parliament (EP).
Although the European Parliament had been in existence since the European Coal and Steel
Community, it had acted more as an advisory body than a true decision-making body. Increasing
EP power was one of the ways European policymakers expressed a clear desire for political
integration during the two-month summit in Maastricht, the Netherlands. Although debates were
often heated, the summit produced the February 1992 Treaty on European lTnion (TEU). The
treaty strengthened the Parliament's powers of scrutiny and monitoring. It also bestowed the
power to investigate complaints of misadministration against European institutions.4o
In Treaty on European Union, often called the Maastricht Treaty, the European Council
also formally established the European Union.

The Union would not only the economic

element of the European Community and the political element of the European Parliament, but
two new "pillars," as they were called. The Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) were the newest branches of the European Union, added by
the Maastricht Treaty.41
According to the timeline set for monetary integration, by June 30, 1997, all member
states passed legislation necessary to establish the euro as a currency. The Exchange Rate
Mechanism indexed member countries' currencies according to the euro. During the spring of
1998, the heads of state in Europe determined whether they would participate in the single
Source: European Monetary Institute, Progress towards Convergence - 1996, Table A, pg. IV and Annual Report;
Online.
Eurostat; DGEP; DGAERI; and September 1997 Report of Excessive Deficits.
http://www.dgep.ptlctconvergenceOI.html
Chart symbols: * ** ***= first, second, and third best performers in terms of price stability.
#= public debt not exceeding 3% of GDP, public debt not exceeding 60% of GDP.
a= for 1996 and 1997. b= In percentages, annual average; in 1997, 12-month average.
c= as percentage of GDP. d= Ireland was not the subject of an EU Council decision under Article 104c (6) of the
Treaty on an excessive deficit exists. In 1996 this was also the case for Denmark.
40 The European Union Encyclopedia and Dictionary: 1999, 3d ed., s.v. "European Parliament."
39
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currency. Later that year, the Council of Ministers of the member states created the European
Central Bank and appointed its executive board. Production of euro bank notes and coins began,
and any remaining legislative problems were addressed. 42
By January 1, 1999, currency exchange rates were set irrevocably in relation to the euro.
The euro became the currency of foreign exchange operations.

Currently, the banking and

finance industries are in the process of changing to the euro, and are scheduled to finish by
January 2002. Member states are working on moving the entire econon1Y, including habituating
their citizens, to the new currency. January 1, 2002 is the date earmarked for the first circulation
of euro bank notes and coins. For six months, the euro will exist alongside national currencies.
After July 1, however, the legal tender status of individual currencies will be cancelled. 43
The European Union has moved a long way from the separate states that characterized

-

Europe before and during W orId War II. The most visible trend in European integration is that

..

political cohesion between the members. Without the authority to harmonize policies indirectly

..
_

economics provided the impetus for political integration. Early attempts at economic integration,
such as the European Coal and Steel Community, failed due to the fact that there was not greater

related to trade (transportation and agriculture, for example), unions that were strictly economic
in scope had difficulty surviving. It proved impossible to deal with economic sectors separately
from political sectors.
While political integration was not quick to catch on, framers of each successive union
set European political integration as their goal.

Community, framers realized that an economic alliance would necessarily force states to

The European Union Encyclopedia and Dictionary: 1999, 3d ed., s.y. "TEU."
European Commission "Euro Website: One Money for Europe," http://europa.eu.intleurolhtmllentry.html
43 Ibid .
41

42
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...

harmonize their policies. 44 France's prime minister counted on that fact when he stated that there

-

was no way Germany and France could wage war against each other if engaged in an economic

-

-

-

-

-

-

alliance over coal and steeL

American Political Integration

According to Peter H. Smith, the history of Latin American-US relations is composed of
three major periods, the "Imperial Era, Stretching from the 1790s through the 1930s; the Cold
War, lasting from the late 1940s through the late 1980s; and the current era, [which he has]
called the Age of Uncertainty, starting in the 1990s.,,45 While this essay will focus mainly on the
latter two periods, Smith's first period lays the foundation for looking at the United States when
writing about Latin An1erica.

With such a long history of political relations, whether

exemplified by mutual agreements between the United States and Latin American States or by
instances in which the United States exercises control, discourse on Latin America would be
incomplete if it did not address the US role in Latin American affairs.
There are two main ways to interpret the US role in regional affairs: 1) a power-hungry
oppressor that forces pan-American integration or 2) a mere participant in pan-American
integration. The first interpretation holds that the United States acts as a self-interested global
power, reigning over its weaker neighbors and subjecting them to its political whims. According
to this theory, the United States forces integration onto the Latin American states, or at least
forced them into a collectivity and set itself as the head of the group. The other interpretation
The word "harmonize" has a specific meaning in International Relations discourse. What it does not indicate is
peaceful coexistence between the policies of two entities. Rather, harmonizing indicates the process by which states
(or other actors) work to bring conflicting policies into accord with one another. While this difference may seem
subtle, it underlines the fact that "harmonizing" is not an easy task to undertake. In the case of Europe, it required
adapting staunchly opposing policies to a central norm. (April Morgan, Introduction to International Relations
lecture, Fall 1999, University of Tennessee.)
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-

views integration as a desire of Latin American states. The second theory posits that Latin

-

-

American States envisioned a united Western Hemisphere, although they sometimes hesitated to
invite the United States. Their hesitancy emerged from the fear that the United States would try
to establish itself as a domineering power in the organization.
In support of the first argument, the United States began its quest to secure a sphere of

-

influence in Latin America as early as the Imperial Era. Smith interprets this phenomenon as an

-

exanlple of balance-of-power politics. He holds that the United States acquired such a region of

-

special interest in order to counter the spheres of influence that every other major power,
especially European states, had at the time. 46 While the United States did not need Latin

-

American resources or labor, it understood the military importance of controlling its neighbors to

-

-

the South. The United States did not fear invasion by Latin America specifically, but rather
worried that a rival European power would claim these areas. By formalizing its presence in
Latin America, the United States could control European presence there.
One point in support of this explanation is that Cuba has long been a coveted military
base. The early United States did not worry that Spain, a weak European power at the time,
would challenge the United States. 47 Rather, the United States feared that a stronger European
state, such as England or France, would take Cuba from Spain. Beginning with this nineteenth-

-

century fear and extending to fear of the Soviet Union half a century ago, the United States has
always struggled to control the island so as not to have a strong military enemy only ninety miles
off its coast.

...
Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations (New York: Oxford UP: 1996),
p.321.
46 Ibid., p. 325.
47 Ibid., p. 19.
45
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-

If one follows this interpretation of inter-American relations, Latin America had only a

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

few possible responses to rising US power.

The first, in line with Simon Bolivar's pan-

Americanism, was to hope for a unified continent in which the United States would not dominate
the other states. Those who suspected their northern neighbor of imperialistic aims considered
forging an alliance with a power outside the hemisphere. Certain states, in particular Argentina
and Brazil, entertained the notion of becoming the regional hegemon. Latin American states
were culturally inclined to resist US pressure, but, in essence, they were too weak politically to
stop the giant. Latin America had little true choice but to endure US presence in its affairs. 48
According to this theory, the groundwork of integration in the Americas lay in US
attempts to stave off other world powers.

Those who directed the first steps of American

integration did not concern themselves with the political aspirations of Latin American states.
Their objective was more along the lines of securing Latin America for the United States in order
to keep Europe from doing so. By closing the door to European intervention, US policymakers
took an important step to protect US sovereignty. 49
On the other hand, the second interpretation of inter-American relations offers a different
perspective. Both the United States and Latin American states sought to expel European power
from the Western Hemisphere. Edmund Gaspar notes that important figures along the timeline
of US history recognized the "common destiny,,50 of the North and Latin America. Earliest,
George Washington mentioned common destiny in his final address, Thomas Jefferson and John

-

-

Ibid., p. 322.
Ibid., p. 51.
50 Edmund Gaspar, United States-Latin America: A Special Relationship? (Washington, DC: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Studies: 1978), p. 22.
48

49

-
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-

Quincy Adams expanded the concept into a notion of hemispheric isolationism, and James

-

-

Monroe included elements of common destiny in his 1823 address to Congress. 51
The second interpretation of early inter-American relations points out, correctly, that the
United States saw Latin America as a group of nations emerging from the same plight it had

-

Europe had no place in the Western Hemisphere, including Latin America. Latin American

_

scholars looked to literature on US independence as a source of inspiration. They hoped the

-

spirit of independence would stimulate their own nationals to revolt against European authorities.

-

interpretations. The United States clearly rejected European influence in the West and advocated

-

-

-

-

recently escaped.

The truth about the beginnings of American integration probably lies between the two

expelling strong European forces from the Hemisphere. On the other hand, the United States
probably acted more in its own self-interest than in the interest of Latin American states.
Any denial that the United States did not serve its own interests over those of Latin
America are idealistic when one considers the number of times the United States intervened in
Latin America in order to affect a certain outcome. From just before the tum of the nineteenth
century to 1934, the United States initiated over thirty military operations in Latin America.
(See Figure 6, HUS Military Interventions in the Caribbean Basin, 1898-1934.) Secretary of
State Richard Olney declared in 1895 that "the United States is practically sovereign on this
continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.,,52 Military
interventions ranged from short missions like the one in Mexico to operations of eight years in
the Dominican Republic (1916 to 1924), nineteen years in Haiti (1915 to 1934), and twenty-five
years in Nicaragua (1909 to 1934).

51

52

-

Recently out of European control themselves, US policymakers felt that

Ibid.
Rosati, p. 25.

-
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-

In response to US military involvement in Latin America, Gaspar states, "the assumption
underlying the original theory of hemispheric unity was that the newly independent American

-

states were bound together by a common belief in the republican-democratic ideal." Most Latin

_

American countries unfortunately did not succeed in implementing that ideaL Aware that

-

Figure 6

-

-

U.S. Military Interventions in the Caribbean Basin, 1898-1934

Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama

1921
1898-1902,1906-1909,1912,1917-1922
1903,1904,1914,1916-1924
1920
1915-1934
1903,1907,1911,1912,1919,1924,1925
1913, 1914, 1916-1917, 1918-1919
1898, 1899, 1909-1910, 1912-1925, 1926-1933
1903-1914,1921,1925

Source: Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations, p. 53.

_

corrupt autocrats had no intention of honoring their democratic claims, the United States sought

-

to intervene on behalf of Latin Americans who continued to champion democracy. Despite US
efforts, intervention failed to institute stable economies or stable democracies in Latin America.

-

On the other hand, intervention incited distrust of the United States and dislike of its imposing

-

power. 53

-

Gaspar's opinion that the United States' true intention was to bolster stable democracies
in Latin America is problematic. Several elements voice the former argument. Policies of three
US Presidents offer support for the view of the United States as a hegemony-seeking power:
•
•

-

53

The Monroe Doctrine, 1823
Theodore Roosevelt's Big Stick Policy, 1901

Gaspar, p. 23.

-

-
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•

William Taft's Dollar Diplomacy, and, later, 1909-1913

In his December 2, 1823 address to Congress, James Monroe laid the foundation for US

-

policy toward Latin America. Those who choose to see the United States as a benevolent big

_.

brother to Latin America point to the wording of the document: "We could not view any

-

interposition for the purpose of oppressing [the newly independent nations], or controlling in any

-

-

-

...

-

-

-

-

other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of
an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." It was the first formal statement designating
Latin America as an area off limits for Europeans.

The purpose of keeping European

colonization out, however, was not for the benefit of Latin American populations, but for the
benefit of expansionist-minded policymakers in the United States.

By determining that no

outside power had authority to intervene in Latin America, Monroe essentially verbalized the
opinion that the United States had the authority to dictate affairs of Latin America.
Teddy Roosevelt fashioned the Roosevelt Corollary around Monroe Doctrine principles.
On September 2, 1901, he quoted one of his favorite African proverbs, which came to be known
as his foreign policy philosophy: "Speak softly and carry a big stick." In this mindset, Roosevelt
clearly reiterated that the United States would not support European intervention in Latin
American Affairs. 54
Once again, the US president's policy seemed to chanlpion democracy in Latin America.
The "Big Stick" policy, however, was not a selfless attempt to protect Latin America. Roosevelt
had no reservations about supporting the Latin American regime that most benefited the United
States. When American leaders strongly desired a canal to connect the Atlantic to the Pacific,
Roosevelt engineered a way to produce that result. He did not hesitate to urge and support
Panamanian insurrection against Colombia. As soon as the quest for independence began, he

-
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-

quickly recognized Panama as an independent country and acquired the Panama Canal site in

-

..

..
..

-

..

..

-

1903. 55
William Howard Taft's policies differed from Roosevelt's strategy of beginning an
insurgency. He sought to spread US influence through trade and investment, hence the term
"Dollar Diplomacy." Where this doctrine came at odds with Latin American sovereignty was in
his use of military force on their territory_

When conflict erupted between Nicaragua and

Honduras, he quickly dispatched troops to protect US nationals and property. Realistically,
Taft's action was to protect US business and investment interests. 56
Under the administration of Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt, the United States
supposedly abandoned such policies of n1ilitary intervention in the 1920s and 1930s. The most
dramatic rejection of former practices was Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy. Instead of
claiming Latin America as a sphere of influence, he opened the Monroe Doctrine up to include
Latin America in a security plan. The two would take joint action against aggressors. 57 While
there were markedly less military interventions into Latin America, the United States did
undertake at least five missions while the Good Neighbor policy was in effect.
Pursuing US interests in Latin America would remain an act of militant control in the
next era. The United States had infringed on Latin America's sovereignty during the Imperial
Era by leaving it few options of escape from US hegemony. That level of infringement even
multiplied during the Cold War Era, when the United States became even more adamant about
the Latin American policies it would allow. Following W orId War II, mutual fears between the

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amexlpresidents/nf/record/tr/trooseveltfp.html
Rosati, p. 25.
56 http://www. pbs.org/wgbh/amexlpresidents/nf/record/taftltaftfp .html
57 Rosati, p. 25.
54
55

-
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-

influence.

..

United States scrutinized Latin America for Soviet supporters, just as it did within its borders

-

during the McCarthy Red Scare. Subverting everything, even the sovereignty of other states, to
its national interest, the United States was crafty in efficiently putting down any organization it

-

deemed dangerous. (Figure 7 provides a list of US military missions in Latin America from the

-

Cold War to the 1990s.) Washington decreed covert operations to undermine non-democratic
regimes and to bolster friendly governments. Anti-communism was at the foundation of every

-

policy decision towards Latin America at the time. 58

-

United States and Soviet Union translated into a tight grasp on their respective spheres of

First and foremost, Washington demanded loyalty to the principle of democracy. The

Figure 7

1954, Guatemala: The CIA organizes the overthrow of the government.
1961, Cuba: Attempts to overthrow Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs.
1965, Donlinican Republic: Johnson sends 22,000 troops to combat the forces trying to regain
power.
1973, Chile: The CIA helps overthrow the government of Allende in Chile.
1981, Nicaragua: The Reagan Administration begins the Contra War.
1983, Grenada: US invasion of Grenada.
1989, Panama: US invasion to arrest accused drug dealer Manual Noriega.
1990, Nicaragua: US intervention in the Nicaraguan election.
1994, Haiti: US military action against the nlilitary and police junta of C6dras and Fran~ois.
Source: Latin American Solidarity Homepage.)~

-

-

US Military Intervention in Latin America
Since World War II

Economics in the Americas

58

Smith, p. 323.

-

-
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With the fall of communism and breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States
no longer needed to hold Latin America in a political grip. This situation allowed room for
another type of interaction with Latin America: an economic as opposed to political interaction.
In the post-World War II era, the United States retained its previous status as the economic giant
of the Western Hemisphere. Whereas the US had faced economic challenge from outside the
hemisphere-from the USSR's challenge to capitalism and from Europe's rapid economic
advances (largely resulting from the European Recovery Program)-no Latin American state
grew to challenge the United States economically.
Despite the fact that the United States strongly advocated and even demanded that
Western Europe engage in trade liberalization and economic integration, the United States was
slow to implement these policies in the Americas.

-

-

-

-

-

It did not seek to integrate with Latin

American states, basing its economy more on trade with Western Europe. The reason for such a
decision was probably based on the fact that US policymakers felt that Western Europe had
higher potential: Europe was heavily industrialized, had long-standing democratic governments,
and had been the world's economic center for centuries. Latin American states, on the other
hand, had few industrialized cities, had difficulty sustaining stable democracies, and had never
enjoyed the prosperous status of Europe. While recent events, namely the war's destruction of
European industry and Europe's bout with fascism would seem to offset this balance, it seemed
clear to policymakers that Europe would quickly recover, but Latin America would continue to
struggle.
Because the United States did not engage in trade agreements with Latin America, in the
1950s, Latin American states initiated a number of free trade alliances and common markets

Latin American Solidarity Homepage, http://www.ukans.edulcwis/organizations/las/las.html. presents an anti-US
bias. The dates of events, however, seem to be accurate.

59

-

-

..

-
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between themselves. The states looked to the integration occurring in Europe as an example.
The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) encouraged the
practice of import substitution6o . The states set up preferential trade agreements as a way to
escape the small-market problem discussed earlier. Through these practices, states and industries
could attain economies of scale and citizens could benefit from efficiency in the market. 61
Four main trade agreenlents emerged in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s:

-

-

•
•
•

-

-

-

•

Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), 1960 (replaced by the Latin
American Integration Association (LAIA) in 1980:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela Central American Common Market (CACM), 1960:
Costa Rica, EI Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua. Caribbean Free Trade
Association, 1965 (replaced by the Caribbean Community, or "Caricom" in 1973):
Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada,
Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.
Andean Pact (AP), 1969:
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and (later) Venezuela62

Each of these agreements followed the same pattern of integration, but some with more
intensity than others. The first, and easiest stage consisted of import substitution. During that
stage, trade expanded rapidly within the region.

However, after that step, the process of

..

early 1980s, advancement in each alliance drew to a standstill. Not one of the four alliances had

-

Saborio explains the fate of these trade agreements:

-

..
..

-

integration slowed rapidly as the debt crisis of the 1970s put pressure on the members. By the

expanded enough to be the dominant market: "intra-regional market shares peaked at 26 percent
(1970) in CACM, 14 percent (1975-1980) in LAFTAILAIA and 4.8 percent (1988) in the AP.,,63

60 Import substitution is the practice of imposing high tariffs on imports.
This practice allows for domestic
companies to produce the goods that were once imported. That is to say, they substitute foreign-produced goods for
domestically produced goods. (Kreinin, p 207.)
61 Sylvia Saborio, "The Long and Winding Road from Anchorage to Patagonia," The Premise and the Promise: Free
Trade in the Americas, ed. Sylvia Saborio, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1992), p. 15 .
62 Ibid., p. 15-6.
63 Ibid., 16.
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The agreements ultimately failed because import-substitution activities did not develop
the efficiency necessary to propel the process forward. The pattern of industrial
protection induced activities that were typically capital- and import-intensive, generating
neither the domestic value added nor the foreign exchange necessary to become selfsustaining. Efforts to rationalize the process usually failed because the removal of trade
barriers-both intra-regional and external-was typically a highly selective, discretionary
affair that invariably fell prey to the vested interests of import competing groups. Over
time, macroeconomic policy became increasingly hemmed in by inconsistencies in the
model-in particular the chronic fiscal and external deficits-until it too imploded, along
with the debt crisis in the early 1980s. On top of these intrinsic inconsistencies is the
basic model, the regional agreements also lacked adequate institutional mechanisms for
settling disputes and remedying enforcement lapses. 64

-

-

-

While the arrangements did not dominate Latin American markets, they did foster industrial
growth and aid in diversifying exports produced. 65
In the 1980s, economic integration again gained popularity in the Americas. Several

-

principles changed the nature of the alliances. First, the guiding philosophy for the refigured

-

alliances centered on foreign investment. Latin American states decided that foreign investors

-

would add much-needed capital and technology to the region, as well as provide outlets for

-

-

-

-

products manufactured there. Second, the market, as opposed to policy interventions, would
determine resource allocation. Finally, instead of implementing policy in a piecemeal fashion
with individual members, the alliances preferred "across-the-board, automatic measures" that
would apply to all members of the pact. 66
The Andean Pact, the first coalition to implement the new trade philosophy, underwent
revision in 1989. Members decided to convert their alliance into a free trade area by 1995 and
further integration into a common market by 1997. Given early success, member states agreed to
move deadlines to 1992 and 1993.

Similarly, members of the Central American Common

Market opened their borders to free movements of goods produced within the region. By the end

Ibid.
Ibid.
66 Ibid., 17.
64
65

-

-

-

-
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of 1992, even agricultural products, often one of the most difficult products to pass legislation,
were allowed to cross borders. By 1994 the states had adopted a common external tariff. The
Caribbean Community (Caricom) expedited its trade liberalization practices in 1990. In general,
the states have been successful in their integration efforts. 67

Mercosur, the "Southern Cone Common Market," began in 1991. The framers of the
Treaty of Asuncion, Mercosur's founding document, agreed to eliminate nearly all tariff and
nontariff barriers. Their goal was to implement a common market by 1995.

-

liberalization initiatives during this time. Beginning in the 1980s, the United States increasingly

-

pursued a policy of trade liberalization. Its first alliance with an An1erican state was the 1984

Latin America was not the only region in the Western Hemisphere to embark on trade

Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Mexico joined the agreement in 1994, changing
the group to the trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A).

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Many find the US change of policy to economic integration unclear. One hypothesis
holds that US policymakers, frustrated by the slow advancement of GATT policies, sought to
increase markets for US goods by raising the level of trade and investment in their two closest
neighbors. Canada already held the position of the United States' largest trading partner and
Mexico was third. 68
The fact that the United States already engaged in high levels of trade with Canada and
Mexico also provided for an alternative hypothesis. The second theory holds that the United
States' unhurried advance toward trade liberalization resulted from the fact that the United States
understood how little opening trade with Canada and Mexico would affect its economy. Barriers
to trade with Canada were already low, so complete liberalization would not encourage massive

67

Ibid.

-

-

-
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trade flows that did not already exist. In fact, data show that trade between Canada and the
United States actually decreased in the first few years after establishing CAFf A. 69
Similarities between the economies of the United States and Canada were likely to reduce
even more the possible impact of trade liberalization between the two states.

As Brown,

Deardoff, and Stem explain, "studies suggesting that Canada's economic welfare might rise by

90/0 or more seem to have been unduly optimistic." It seemed more likely that relaxing trade

-

restrictions. 70

-

could permit a large increase in trade between the two states. According to a study cited by

..

--

-

-

restrictions would do nothing to affect the standard of living in either state. Macroeconomic
fluctuations proved to have a greater effect on the Canadian economy than reduced trade

Trade with Mexico was a very different case, however. While tariffs on Mexican goods
were low, as with Canada, more non-tariff barriers hindered trade. Mexican goods faced tough
standards and agriculture faced heavy restrictions at the US border. Relaxation of these policies

Brown, Deardoff, and Stem, relaxation of non-tariff barriers against "textiles and steel alone
would raise Mexico's exports of steel to the United States by 3,416.70/0 and Mexican welfare by
2.8%.,,71

Additionally, the difference between the economies of Mexico and the United States is
much greater than that between the United States and Canada, as shown by Figure 8. Many
economists on each side of the border hypothesize that adding Mexico into an alliance with its
neighbors to the North would serve to raise its standard of living. This reasoning seems

Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern, "North American Integration," The Economic
Journal 102 (November 1992): 1507.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 1509.
68

...

-

-

-
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Figure 8
Western Hemisphere: Basic Economic Indicators, 1990

Areal
Country
NORTH AMERICA
United States
Canada

Population
GOP
(millions) ($ billions)
276.4
5,999.00

GOP per
Capita ($)
21,706

Investment Trade per
Per Cap ($) GOP (%)
3,595
23.8

Inflation

(0/0)

250
26.4

5,423.40
575.6

29,696
29,803

3,486
4,628

21.1
50

4.9
5.7

431.9

840.5

1,946

378

30.7

1,186.30

384
88.6
13.2

788.7
175.5
32.3

2,054
1,980
2,451

404
463
550

28.9
38.9
57.8

29.9
27.3

92.2
7.3
33
10.6
21.6
19.7

154.5
6.4
46.7
13.2
28.3
60

1,677
870
1,416
1,249
1,312
3,038

297
79
285
284
312
389

33.3
28.4
30.5
37.8
28.1
37.5

18
32
49.5
7,657.80
36.5

190.1
32.3
150.4
4.3
3.1

426.4
84.8
326.2
6.4
9

2,244
2,623
2,169
1,493
2,921

418
226
465
366
235

20.9
23.1
19
55
46.8

1,343.90
1,585.20
44.1
129

CENTRAL AMERICA
Costa Rica
EI Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua

26.5
3
5.3
9.2
5.1
3.9

25.5
5.1
5.7
8.2
4.5
2

962
1,677
1,091
892
880
505

153
402
121
114
114
149

51.8
80.5
45.1
40.2
47.7
54.8

27.5
19.3
59.6
36.4
13,490.90

OTHER
Barbados
Dominican Republic
Guayana
Haiti
Jamaica
Panama
Suriname
Trinidad and
Tobago

21.2
0.3
7.2
0.8
6.5
2.5
2.4
0.4
1.2

23.8
1.5
5.1
0.4
2.1
3.5
4.7
1.3
5.1

1,120
5,835
716
554
324
1,401
1,941
3,320
4,195

189
1,141
157
142
35
412
55
518
727

73.1
94.2
81.4
146.9
37.5
108.6
62.2
51.1
58.2

3.4
100.7
n.a.
26.1
29.7
1.5
n.a.
9.5

LATIN AMERICA
LAIA
Mexico
Chile
Andean Pact
Bolivia
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Venezuela
Mercosur
Argentina
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
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-
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especially valid when one considers the current labor situation in the two states. In 1991, twenty
percent of Mexican workers were employed in the United States. Mexico's labor force was
growing at a rate of five percent per year, while the United States' labor force was growing very
slowly. Allowing the Mexican labor force to move north with less restriction would increase

-

cash flows back to Mexico, raising the Mexican standard of living.

-

Canada for two reasons: 1) US-Mexican trade has more room for liberalizing and 2) US and

-

Mexican standards of living have more room to center around an equilibrium. Both members

...

-

..

-

..
..

..
-

In sum, liberalizing with Mexico will cause a greater impact than liberalizing trade with

will not feel the impact to the same degree, though. Several features signify that the economic
impact will be nluch greater for Mexico than for the United States. Most important is the fact
that trade is not equally important between the two members. Even though Mexico holds the
position of third largest trading partner with the United States, trade with Mexico comprises a
small portion of the United States' GNP. For that matter, the entire gross domestic product of
Mexico is only 3.2 percent of US GDP. On the other hand, exports to the United States comprise
a significant portion of Mexican GNP, so trade liberalization would greatly affect the Mexican
economy.
Mexican economists see a trade agreement with the United States as a step in the
direction of economic improvement. Because of this sentiment, Mexico was responsible for
initiating most trade negotiations with the United States. The United States did find several
aspects of trade liberalization with Mexico appealing. US policymakers were attracted to cheap
resources. Businesses found cheap raw materials and a cheap, rapidly growing labor supply two
appealing benefits from lowered trade boundaries. Finally, US politicians desired to "strengthen

-
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..

democratic institutions along [the] borders, control illegal immigration, and facilitate drug

-

interdiction."n
Whatever its true reasons for going along with the plan for integrating North America
into a free trade agreement, the United States has not been without opposition from within.
Labor unions fear the loss of American jobs to low-wage Mexican workers. Politicians such as
Ross Perot and Pat Buchanan popularized this notion just before the inception of NAFTA. They

-

-

-

-

-

-

warned of a "giant sucking sound" of American jobs flowing south to Mexico.
During the process of trade liberalization with Mexico, the notion of opening US borders
to free trade with all of Latin America or South America has been unheard of. Opposition has
been strong against adding Mexico, which ranks among the better performing states in GDP per
capita and investment per capita. (Its GDP per capita ranks ninth of the twenty-four states
counted and only five of the twenty-four have a higher investment per capita.) Latin America73
had twice the population of Canada and .the United States combined by 1990, yet Latin
America's GDP was less than one seventh of US gross domestic product.

From a US

perspective, such statistics dispel the very idea of pan-American trade liberalization. Whereas
the strong US economy might be able to stand the shock of incorporating the relatively small
Mexican economy, it certainly could not support all of Latin America at once.
Outside the United States, Latin America has made a great deal of progress in setting up
regional trade agreements. Part of this phenomenon, again, originates from small-state desires to
tap larger markets and attain economies of scale. States, however, have not suggested a union

Ibid. 1507.
Statistic includes population estimates for Mexico, Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela,
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Barbados, the
Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, panama, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
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with any more requirements than the common market. The likely reason that Latin America has
not integrated to this point probably has to do with the politics of integration.
One cultural consistency among Latin American states is distaste of the US political
imperialism.

They resent having a dominating power in the hemisphere to monitor them.

-

Likewise, Latin American states are averse to the idea of ceding political power to a Latin

_

states' reluctance to yield political sovereignty to an established authority. In order to found a

-

deeper economic alliance than a common market, the states would have to engage in a political

-

-

-

-

-

American entity. This cultural characteristic provides one explanation for Western Hemisphere

alliance they are not currently willing to forge.

Conclusion: European Integration vs. American Integration
Clearly, Europe has integrated at a pace unrivaled in the Americas. In the course of half
a century, Europe has established one of the strongest economic and political junctions in the
world.

In the Americas, progress lags behind the stage Europe passed in the late 1950s.

Furthemlore, America has not imitated the depth of European integration. While the European
Union has implemented a method for punishing states that violate its demands the Americas have
not established a hierarchical sovereign that can effectively punish members. The cases of Haiti
in the early 1990s and Austria in 2000 prove this point.

74

There are several reasons that the two blocs integrated differently. In both cases an
outside impetus for integration, namely the United States, prodded the region toward integration.
First, the early United States pressed Latin America into a collective group by insisting that no
cases of Austria and Haiti demonstrate this point. When the EU community disagreed with the rise of Joerg
Haider's Freedom Party early in 2000, the fourteen other members of the euro zone imposed sanctions against
Austria. On the other hand, the OAS was not able to enforce sanctions against Haiti in 1992 when US President
Bush did not want to injure US business interests in Haiti. The United States was able to circumvent the OAS
74The

-

-

-

-
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strong European power be allowed in the region. These were the first demonstrations of the
United States shaping Latin American destiny. Throughout the Cold War, the United States'
political control over Latin America increased. Many argue that the United States overstepped
its bounds, infringing upon other states' sovereignty when it determined to depose certain rulers
and tailor Latin American governments to its own needs.
Next, US pressure to integrate Europe became more explicit in Europe.

Given that

Europe had recently fought the most destructive war in history and that the Soviet Union posed a
perceived threat to democracy, the United States felt that political and economic integration were
legitimate demands to make. An economic alliance over valuable resources would not only
make it impossible for European powers to wage a war against each other, it would encourage
policymakers to harmonize political issues between them. The reasoning was that an economic
alliance would lead to a political alliance.

Once European states attained a high level of

integration in the two fields, it would be impossible for them to break apart in order to challenge
each other.

-

-

-

More important during the era, a close economic and political relationship between the
member states made infiltration of communism less of a threat. During the time of poverty after
World War's destruction, government officials began to worry that a discontent populace would
tum to communism. Hungry and exhausted from the war, people might seek solace in a system
that emphasized equal access to resources for everyone. Actions of this sort were fresh on the
minds of Europeans: Germany and Italy had fostered undemocratic regimes in the recent past.
To stave off such an action, European and US officials felt that building strong democracies
would repel the popular attractions of such a system.

sanctions policy, and even go so far as to begin a military intervention in 1994 without the approval of other
American states.
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As for political integration in the European states, framers of the Maastricht Treaty had a
difficult time agreeing which country would retain its domestic policies and which ones would
be forced to change. Successive economic unions had collapsed because of unwillingness to
conform to region-wide standards. Therefore, if the framers were to create a system in which
they could further reap the benefits of trade arrangements they had made, it was necessary to
establish a political system that would endure through the difficult policy choices.
The pattern of integration in Europe, therefore, was that economic factors pushed
political factors. Not until Europe discovered the benefits of trade liberalization were Europeans
anxious to institute political integration.

That pattern did not hold true for Latin America,

however. Political factors (namely, hegemony on the part of the United States) led to the first
wave of economic integration.

However, as exemplified by the relatively low level of

integration that persists, the political pressures were not extremely effective in establishing
integration. In fact, the effects of social phenomena possibly contributed more to the integration
of Latin America than any political ideal. For example, distaste of US prodding probably unified
Latin Americans more than US demands.
From these two cases, my deduction is that integration is more likely when states pursue
economic benefits than when their goal is purely political. While Europe's economic integration
was extremely rapid, political integration required much more time and effort. Economic efforts
were realized as early as the late 1960s, yet true political advances took until the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Many Europeans are still wary about ceding power to an authority higher than their
state. Not wanting to compromise their political and cultural autonomy, they proclaim that they
do not want a "United States of Europe.,,75

75

My French host sister, Lucille, said this, just before the European Parliament elections in the summer of 1999.
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That said, will Latin America continue to integrate to the point that Europe has attained?
While it is nearly impossible to predict the future and there are many more factors to consider,
my assessment is that Latin American integration will depend on the success of Europe's
economic and monetary union. For many years, the United States has held a strong trading
relationship with Western European states. In the past few years, however, the Europe has begun
to become less important. In the past few years, the United States' largest trading partners have
been Canada, Japan, and then Mexico. Europe currently holds fourth place, but continues to fall
in percentage of trade it captures in the United States. Given that the economics seems to be the
strongest driving force for integration, the fact that the United States no longer carries on as
much trade with Europe could provide the momentum for Latin American integration.
The European Union already includes a larger population and larger total GDP than the
United States, even excluding the states that have not adopted the single currency. (See Figure
9.) As cross-border trade in Europe becomes easier, the US market may become a less-attractive
option for exporters in Europe. Since they would not have to pay tariffs or high transportation
costs, Italian producers would be able to sell goods cheaper in other European states than in the
United States. They could also offer their products at a lower price than US producers, who
would have to contend with tariffs and transportation costs.

Given these economic

considerations, the United States may be phased out of trade with Europe to a degree that harms
the United States. Seeing the economic benefits of a closer union with its Southern neighbors,
the United States may again push for integration.
Before diving into an economic union with Latin America, however, the United
States must consider the effect of integrating with states that do not have similar economies.
Europe has been careful to specify the types of economies that are allowed to join its union .
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Strict convergence criteria ensure that one member does not threaten the welfare of the other
members. In the case of the United States and Canada, however, the economic differential is

Figure 9

How Large is the Euro Zone?
Euro Zone

EU

USA

Japan

Population (millions)

290

374

268

126

Geographic area (sq. miles)

910,000

1,300,000

3,720,000

150,000

GDP (billions)

6,309

8,093

7,819

4,223

GDP per capita ($)

21,600

21,600

29,200

33,500

Source: Christian N. Chabot, Understanding the Euro: The Clear and Concise Guide to the New TransEuropean Economy, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999), p. 16.

much greater. (See Figure 8.) The per capita GDP of Venezuela, one of the Latin American
states with relatively high GDPs, is only a tenth of US GDP per capita. The European Union has
reserved the right to reject members from the single currency alliance if they could not improve
their economies to a certain minimum standard. Latin American states would fail these tests of
economic strength.
If the Western Hemisphere implemented an economic union, the US government would

-

have to address the fact that, with a population of over 432 billion and unemployment over ten

_

percent, that forty three billion Latin Americans might flock to the United States and Canada.

..

Even more could migrate to the United States in hopes of better living conditions, medical care,

-

-

-

and education. It would be impossible for the Canadian and US governments to accommodate a
sudden influx of this magnitude.
Latin American states eagerly welcome US participation in an economic alliance, since
US involvement would provide a large market of wealthy consumers. However, a precondition
for US involvement in a stronger economic union is the strengthening of Latin American
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economIes. Perhaps, through the trade liberalization that Latin America revived in the 1980s,
they will see a vast expansion in economic growth. While expansion would probably require a
longer time than did Europe after World War II, substantial economic growth may be possible.
For instance, all Latin American states except Paraguay experienced economic growth during
1997 and 1998.
Unless such economic improvement occurs, creating an obvious benefit for the United
States to further integrate with Latin America, it is unlikely that the United States will seek
further integration with all Latin American states. In a 1994 summit on Western Hemisphere
integration, for example, the United States demonstrated its unwillingness to join in a tight
alliance. The United States pushed the deadline for ending talks on the subject to 2005, and that
date was set only after Latin American pressure. 76
As for Latin America, integration will likely continue.

Integration seems to be a

beneficial action. Latin American states often criticize the United States for not proceeding with

-

-

reciprocating their trade liberalization, especially after the United States strongly advocated trade
liberalization when it sought Latin American markets.
Europe has gone through the brunt of its appropriations for the common currency. The
public is divided as to whether the union will fail or whether it will get stronger. Since its
inception, the euro has fallen under the exchange rate of the dollar, and, pointing out its
weaknesses, states like the United Kingdom are reluctant to join. Based on the fact that there is
already a high-level of economic integration in Europe that seems to foster growth for the
members, my opinion is that the EU euro zone will be a successful union.

James Brooke, "On Even of Miami Summit Talks, U.S. Comes Under Fire," New York Times, December 8,
1994. Online. LEXIS®-NEXIS® Academic Universe. 30 April 2000.
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The summit on Western Hemisphere integration in 2005 is likely to contain pivotal
decisions about these issues. At that point, the euro will have been in effect for three years, long
enough to gain early insight into the success of the monetary union. Latin America will have had

-

-
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a few more years to bolster its individual economies, and the effects of Mercosur, which may
tum out to be the strongest economic union in Latin and South America, will be clear. At this
time, if Europe has experienced progress that makes trade with the United States less important,
and if Latin America has experienced economic development that makes it a target market for
the United States, my prediction is that the United States will engage in further trade
liberalization with Latin America. It is unlikely that the United States would open its borders to
a high-level economic pact such as a common market or economic union, but chances are greater
that it might begin liberalization by initiating a hemisphere-wide free trade area.

